| 引用本文：殷潇, 张欲晓, 毛宗福.我国药品流通领域改革政策研究评述——基于利益相关者博弈视角[J].中国卫生政策研究,2017,10(6):13-19 |
|
| 我国药品流通领域改革政策研究评述——基于利益相关者博弈视角 |
| 投稿时间：2017-03-12 修订日期：2017-05-11 PDF全文浏览 HTML全文浏览 |
| 殷潇, 张欲晓, 毛宗福 |
| 武汉大学健康学院 湖北武汉 430071 |
| 摘要:药品流通领域改革是我国“三医联动”改革的关键环节。改革政策的制定、推行必然导致利益再分配。因此，从各利益主体博弈的视角对其进行评价，是全面理解改革过程中出现的非预期结果，从而科学决策政策走向，确保改革顺利推进的有效手段。本文通过梳理新医改以来药品流通领域改革政策及其研究文献，揭示现有研究存在的问题和不足，论证基于科学理论框架下的政策评价是判断改革目标是否实现的有力工具。将利益相关者理论和博弈理论引入药品流通领域进行政策评价，能够将复杂的影响因素在其理论框架下科学量化，从而揭示政策效果的因果机制，对药品流通领域改革政策有更清晰的解读和总结，为下一步政策走向提供科学合理的参考。 |
| 关键词:药品流通领域改革 政策评价 利益相关者 博弈 |
|
| A review on drug circulation policy in China:Based on stakeholder game theory |
| YIN Xiao, ZHANG Yu-xiao, MAO Zong-fu |
| School of Health, Wuhan University, Wuan Hubei 430071, China |
| Abstract:The pharmaceutical circulation policy reform is the key link of the"three medical linkage"reform with a view of deepening medical reform.The policy formulation and implementation will inevitably lead to interest redistribution.Therefore,it is an effective means to comprehensively understand the unexpected results of the reform and the scientific decision-making of the policy direction,while ensuring the smooth progress of the reform.Based on the research literature presented on pharmaceutical circulation reform and policies since the new medical reform,this paper revealed the prevailing problems and limitations of the existing researches,demonstrated that policy evaluation based on the scientific theory framework is a powerful tool to judge whether the reform goals are achieved.With the introduction of the stakeholder theory and the game theory in pharmaceutical circulation policy evaluation,the complex influence factors can be quantified under scientific theoretical framework,so that the causal mechanism of the policy effect can be learnt,which can help to have a clearer interpretation of the pharmaceutical circulation reform policy,and to provide a scientific and reasonable reference for future policy direction. |
| Key words:Drug circulation reform Policy evaluation Stakeholder theory Game theory |
| 摘要点击次数: 1733 全文下载次数: 0 |
|
|
|
|
|
