| 引用本文：韩汶静, 云青萍, 吴明.中国公立医院院长政治激励研究——复旦榜医院经济运行绩效与医院院长职位变动的实证证据[J].中国卫生政策研究,2021,14(10):68-74 |
|
| 中国公立医院院长政治激励研究——复旦榜医院经济运行绩效与医院院长职位变动的实证证据 |
| 投稿时间：2021-09-22 修订日期：2021-10-17 PDF全文浏览 HTML全文浏览 |
| 韩汶静, 云青萍, 吴明 |
| 北京大学公共卫生学院 北京 100191 |
| 摘要:本研究利用2009—2015年152位中国大型公立医院院长的职位变动数据，第一次从经验上分析了医院经济运行绩效以及院长个人特征对院长职位变动的影响，完善了院长政治激励的研究证据。研究发现：（1）医院良好的经济运行状态对院长稳固当前职位、增加晋升概率具有积极意义。（2）医院医疗收入的增长会降低院长卸任的概率，增加晋升的概率。其中，相对于医疗收入年增长率，任期内医院医疗收入增长的移动平均对院长职位变动的影响更明显。（3）具有上级主管部门任职经历的院长晋升概率相对更高。（4）公立医院院长的政治激励与政府官员和国有企业高管稍有不同，后两者主要的激励方式是职位晋升，但在公立医院中，医院绩效的改善对延长院长在任时间、降低卸任概率作用更明显，对晋升的影响相对较小。 |
| 关键词:公立医院 院长 政治激励 |
|
| Research on the political incentive mechanisms of public hospital directors in China: Empirical evidence of a correlation of hospitals' economic performance with directors' appointment changes in hospitals list on China's hospital ranking (Fudan) |
| HAN Wen-jing, YUN Qing-ping, WU Ming |
| School of Public Health, Peking University, Beijing 100191, China |
| Abstract:This study collected the appointment change statistics of 152 directors of China's large public hospitals within the period of 2009—2015, and for the first time analyzed by experience how a hospital's economic performance and a director's personality would impact the director's appointment change, which provided complementary evidence for the study of political incentive mechanisms of public hospital directors. This study found that: (1) A benign economic performance of the hospital could help the director keep his/her current appointment and also increase the probability of promotion. (2) An increase in the hospital's medical income could reduce the director's probability of resignation and increase the probability of promotion. Particularly, compared with the growth rate, the moving average amount of the hospital's medical income growth during the director's tenure had a larger impact on the appointment change. (3) Directors with experience of working in superior departments had a higher probability of promotion. (4) The political incentives of public hospital directors were slightly different from those of government officials and state-owned enterprise executives. The latter two were mainly motivated by job promotion, whereas in public hospitals, improvement of hospital performance had a lager impact on extending the director's tenure and reducing the probability of resignation, but had a relatively smaller effect on promotion. |
| Key words:Public hospital Hospital directors Political incentive |
| 摘要点击次数: 1190 全文下载次数: 519 |
|
|
|
|
|
