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| 投稿时间： 2015-12-25 最后修改时间： 2016-01-14 摘要点击次数: 2362 全文下载次数: 1537 |
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| 引用本文：张奇林, 宋心璐.美国罕用药市场的激励机制及其启示[J].中国卫生政策研究,2016,9(2):36-44 |
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| 张奇林, 宋心璐 |
| 武汉大学社会保障研究中心 湖北 武汉 430072 |
| 基金项目:教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(15JJD630009) |
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| | 摘要:罕用药市场因为激励不足存在严重失灵的问题。美国通过立法,针对罕用药的研发、认定、临床试验直至上市等各个环节,设计和建立了自成体系。联动共进的罕用药激励机制,改变了罕用药的供给和需求状况,使美国成为世界上罕用药上市最多的国家,有效缓解了罕用药市场失灵的问题。美国的经验为我国罕用药市场激励机制的建立和良性发展提供了有益的借鉴。 | |
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关键词:美国 罕见疾病 罕用药 激励机制
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| Incentive mechanism and implications of orphan drug market in the United States |
| ZHANG Qi-lin, SONG Xin-lu |
| The Center for Social Security Studies of Wuhan University, Wuhan Hubei 430072, China |
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| | Abstract:Serious market failure, as a result of insufficient incentive, exists in the orphan drugs market. Through legislation, the United States designed and established its owns systematic and linked orphan drugs incentive mechanism, which direct sat research, definition, clinical trials and approval of orphan drugs, so as to change the supply and demand status of orphan drugs. Such incentive mechanism erables the United States possess the most approved orphan drugs in the world, and effectively relieves the problem of market failure of the orphan drugs. The experience of the United States provides beneficial reference for the establishment and positive development of orphan drugs incentive mechanism in China. | |
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