| 引用本文：戈文鲁,葛洪刚,兰迎春.治理我国医疗服务领域供方道德风险的策略研究[J].中国卫生政策研究,2011,4(2):57-62 |
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| 治理我国医疗服务领域供方道德风险的策略研究 |
| 投稿时间：2010-07-28 修订日期：2010-11-12 PDF全文浏览 HTML全文浏览 |
| 戈文鲁, 葛洪刚, 兰迎春 |
| 山东济宁医学院社会科学部 |
| 摘要:信息不对称和医疗服务供方的机会主义倾向而导致的供方道德风险是医疗服务领域普遍存在的现象，因此必须通过合理、科学的制度设计比如政府积极介入、加强医院和医生自身建设、完善激励机制和声誉机制、第三方积极介入等手段，才能抑制由于信息不对称等原因而引发的供方道德风险，从而有效维护患者的切身利益。 |
| 关键词:医疗服务 道德风险 制度设计 |
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| Strategies of inquiry on the governance of supplier’ moral hazard in health care sector in China |
| GE Wen-lu, GE Hong-gang, LAN Ying-chun |
| Social Science Department, Jining Medical University |
| Abstract:The moral hazard is the universal phenomenon based on the asymmetry information and the opportunism of the suppliers, so we must adopt effective measures to control it through scientific system designs such as government actively intervention, strengthening the construction of hospitals and doctors, improving inventive mechanism and credit mechanism, third party actively intervention. This could effectively preserve the vital interest of the patients. |
| Key words:Medical service Moral hazard System design |
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