| 引用本文：郑娟,王健.基于委托代理关系的公立医院员工激励机制分析[J].中国卫生政策研究,2013,6(2):44-48 |
|
| 基于委托代理关系的公立医院员工激励机制分析 |
| 投稿时间：2012-09-13 修订日期：2012-12-20 PDF全文浏览 HTML全文浏览 |
| 郑娟1, 王健1 |
| 山东大学卫生管理与政策研究中心 |
| 摘要:文章阐述了基于委托代理关系研究激励机制的重要性，分析了公立医院中委托代理关系的类型，指出基于委托代理关系的激励机制在公立医院中的作用，并具有系统性、复杂性和绩效评价的不确定性等特点。在此基础上探讨了激励机制设计所面临的挑战，包括：激励机制尚未系统化；委托人与代理人的目标利益不一致；忽视对员工的绩效管理等。最后根据我国公立医院运行现状和上述的主要问题提出了相应对策，这对公立医院设计合理的激励机制，实现医院的科学发展具有一定意义。 |
| 关键词:委托代理关系 激励机制 特点 挑战 对策 |
|
| A principal agent incentive mechanism for staff in public hospitals |
|
|
| Abstract:In this article， we discuss the importance of incentive mechanism based on a principal agent relationship， analyze the principal agent relationship types in public hospitals and point out the characteristics of incentive mechanism including systematicness， complexities and uncertainties of performance evaluation Currently, the incentive mechanism is not systematic; benefits are differerent between the clients and the agents； and there is a lack of targeted incentives We suggest measures for improving the incentive mechanism, which is of importance to the scientific development of public hospitals in China |
| Key words:Principal Agent Relationship Incentive mechanism Characteristic Challenge Strategy |
| 摘要点击次数: 2704 全文下载次数: 1458 |
|
|
